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What About Non-Human Life? 
An “Ecological” Reading of Michel Henry’s 
Critique of Technology  
Christina M. Gschwandtner 
Fordham University 
At the end of I am the Truth, Michel Henry laments a technology which 
“extends its reign to the whole planet, sowing desolation and ruin 
everywhere.”1 He pictures an entirely automated world where real affective 
experience is replaced by simulacra and where genuine life is denigrated 
and excluded. Such exclusion of authentic life by its artificial replacement 
causes enormous problems in society, as it removes us from real life, from 
each other, and from our own selves. Experience becomes entirely mediated, 
and is no longer immediate or grounded in real fleshly materiality. Henry’s 
critique of technology, articulated in multiple works from his 1987 text 
Barbarism to his final work Words of Christ, is trenchant and illuminating. 
Integral to it is a critique of the vision and analysis of life proposed by 
contemporary science and a recovery of the immediate passionate and 
ultimately divine Life of humans. This seems to suggest that his critique of 
technology is directed solely at the impact technology has on humans and 
disregards the ways in which it also sows “desolation and ruin” for non-
human life and indeed for the “whole planet.” Yet, are humans the only 
living beings, as Henry seems to assert? Can his phenomenology of 
immanent Life not also have implications for non-human life? In this paper I 
seek to show that Henry’s critique of technology can be used against his 
own stark divisions between human and non-human life and consequently 
can become useful for a more inclusive ecological vision that would help us 
address the havoc wrought upon our planet by the unbridled use of 
technology. The first part of the paper lays out Henry’s critique of 
technology in some detail, highlighting the ways in which it contains 
important insights for our contemporary situation. The second part of the 
paper explores the stark division Henry draws between human generation 
from the divine life and the creation of everything else, including his 
rejection of any identification of humans with “protozoa and honey bees,” 
which would seem to suggest a complete lack of concern for non-human life. 
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The final part of the paper seeks to find a way beyond this dichotomy by 
showing how Henry’s proposal, despite his own anthropocentric focus, can 
provide resources for ecophenomenology by extending his critique of 
technology in environmentally conscious ways without losing sight of his 
phenomenological insights about life and the human condition. 
Henry’s Critique of Technology 
Technology kills life and empties it of pathos. That is Henry’s most 
fundamental contention. Technology is artificial, renders life inauthentic, 
and denies us access to true reality. It separates us from our own fleshly and 
immanent experience and instead mediates experience in artificial ways that 
are no longer grounded in material reality. It also makes us unfeeling, 
uncaring, unloving, ultimately inanimate. These claims are grounded in a 
larger assumption about the contemporary scientific enterprise. According 
to Henry, starting with Galileo, science has assumed the mantle of truth. 
Instead of remaining in its own limited sphere, it has posited itself as the 
only true access to reality and invalidated all other approaches, especially 
those of the humanities.2 Yet, it is not science as such that is the problem for 
Henry, but the idea that a Galilean conception of science may become the 
only truth and that all other truths would be subordinated to it and judged 
on its terms: “It is not scientific knowledge that is in question; it is the 
ideology joined to it today which holds that it is the sole possible knowledge 
and that all other ones must be eliminated.”3 From Galileo onward, 
reductionistic accounts of life and the world predominate: all human 
passions and joys become reduced to purely scientific accounts of molecules, 
neurons, chemical transmitters, and so forth. Contemporary techno-science 
is the direct result of this Galilean exclusion of what might be called 
“phenomenological life” in favor of scientific and mechanized accounts of 
life. In consequence, Henry draws an absolute distinction between 
contemporary science in the form of technology, which claims to deal with 
life but actually does not, and culture, which is the harbinger of true life and 
sensibility.4 He outlines this argument the most fully in Barbarism, a text that 
reads like a manifesto and evoked plenty of controversy when it was first 
published in France. Technology is the very root of barbarism and 
destructive of culture and of the intellectual life which sustains and animates 
it. In fact, science and technology are destructive of life in several of its 
facets: First, they attack economic life and eliminate authentic labor and 
meaningful work. Second, they destroy culture, particularly art and 
intellectual life, ultimately forming an attack upon the university. Third, 
especially in their manifestation as media technology, they invade social and 
personal life and render us less than human and incapable of genuine 
relationships. Hence, most fundamentally, contemporary techno-science 
transforms and maybe even eliminates genuine human life and identity. 
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First, as “technique” invades labor and the processes of production it 
eliminates life. Production is no longer a “living” work and the relationship 
between workers and their labor in all its physical manifestations is severed. 
This constitutes a real material change, as robots and machines take over 
from real people and their physical bodies engaged with the material. 
Information technology exacerbates this situation and removes us even 
further from actual life.5 Henry indicts technology as “nature without the 
human being... abstract nature, reduced to itself,” which becomes a self-
actualization of nature exclusive of the human being.6 The technological 
revolution eliminates life and reduces everything to mechanical processes. 
All rationale for production and value of work disappears. Henry makes a 
similar argument in I am the Truth. Technology severs work from life and 
action and turns it into inanimate and anonymous processes. This has dire 
consequences: Workers are excluded from economic and social life in an 
“uncontrolled capitalism.” As technology “sweeps man away from the 
surface of the earth” it manifests itself as the “anti-Christ” in its negation of 
life.7 Henry employs the example of a flight simulator to illustrate this 
removal from real life and its material and affective manifestations, 
concluding that this leads to a “madness” in which the difference between 
reality and appearances or simulation can no longer be perceived.8 In all 
these ways human identity as traditionally shaped through meaningful 
labor is alienated from itself and rendered artificial through its 
mechanization. 
Second, technological progress is tantamount to murder of aesthetic, 
intellectual, spiritual and moral life. Techno-science feeds on an internal 
contradiction because it is a mode of life that opposes life. Its way of 
“sensing and experiencing oneself” turns against itself.9 He calls it an 
ideology, a positivism, a flight from self.10 Only culture (and 
phenomenological analysis) has access to true life as the intimate auto-
affection of our sensibility. As in his work on Kandinsky, Henry employs art 
as a critique for science, showing how art captures the reality of life more 
fully and more authentically than the abstract objectivity of Galilean 
science.11 Television especially shows our current self-delusion and the 
obsession with images characteristic of the contemporary flight from the 
self.12 Media, science and technology here become practically equated for 
him or at least closely connected. Technology dominates all other domains 
of thought and imposes its way of operating upon them. True affect is 
eliminated and the projected image, which has no genuine substance but is 
only a fleeting appearance, becomes the sole reality. The “ontological 
essence of television” is destructive of life and essentially negates it.13 The 
“actual,” which television constantly portrays in its obsession with 
contemporaneity, is incoherent and insignificant: “The more absurd 
television becomes, the better does it fulfill its function.”14 Even when it 
treats important matters, it renders them essentially meaningless. All 
existence becomes mediated and thus is no longer authentic experience of 
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life.15 Henry brings these arguments together again by arguing at the end of 
his treatment that technology destroys universities and university life, which 
loses its essential task of educating people for life. This is why he calls this 
contemporary destruction of life barbaric. Our world has become inhuman 
and insensible. It has undergone an ontological upheaval, so that society is 
no longer rooted in life, but in the “processes and procedures that have set 
aside life so that they can be established and used.”16 Freedom of the press 
and of information supplants and replaces genuine freedom of cultural 
expression. 
Yet, television and other media not only destroy art and meaningful 
labor, but also attack our very humanity by destroying social relationships 
and alienating us from ourselves. The visual image transposes real affective 
experience into simulacra, trivializes them and presents them in their most 
violent form. It becomes a “voyeurism” that replaces genuine experience 
and ultimately eliminates life.17 Again, Henry carries this criticism even 
further in I am the Truth, where he provides a portrayal of technology’s 
substitute for life, which produces pleasures in purely artificial fashion and 
brings with it various social ills that become essentially invisible to us: 
People debased, humiliated, despised and despising 
themselves, trained in school to despise themselves, to 
count for nothing—just particles and molecules; admiring 
everything lesser than themselves and execrating 
everything that is greater than themselves. Everything 
worthy of love and adoration. People reduced to 
simulacra, to idols that feel nothing, to automatons. And 
replaced by them—by computers and robots. People 
chased out of their work and their homes, pushed into 
corners and gutters, huddled on subway benches, sleeping 
in cardboard boxes. People replaced by abstractions, by 
economic entities, by profits and money. People treated 
mathematically, digitally, statistically, counted like 
animals and counting for much less. People turned away 
from Life’s Truth, caught in all the traps and marvels 
where this life is denied, ridiculed, mimicked, simulated—
absent. People given over to the insensible, become 
themselves insensible, whose eyes are empty as a fish’s. 
Dazed people, devoted to specters and spectacles that 
always expose their own invalidity and bankruptcy; 
devoted to false knowledge, reduced to empty shells, to 
empty heads—to “brains.” People whose emotions and 
loves are just glandular secretions. People who have been 
liberated by making them think their sexuality is a natural 
process, the site and place of their infinite Desire. People 
whose responsibility and dignity have no definite site 
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anymore. People who in the general degradation will envy 
the animals. People will want to die—but not Life. It is not 
just any god today who is still able to save us, but—when 
the shadow of death is looming over the world—the One 
who is Living.18 
This is a heavy indictment: technology denies, ridicules, mimics, 
simulates life, but ultimately kills all pathos and renders us empty shells 
devoid of life. Barbarism had already ended on a similar note: “They would 
like to transmit this culture, to enable one to become what one is, and to 
escape the unbearable boredom of the techno-media world with its drugs, 
monstrous growth, anonymous transcendence. But it has reduced them to 
silence once and for all. Can the world still be saved by some of them?”19 I 
am the Truth now responds to this question: we can be saved by the “Living 
One”—Christ. The only alternative to the dangers of technology for Henry is 
the one who brings Life and who can help us participate in this life, a life of 
love and pathos. The “ethic” of Christianity, he suggests, is an ethic of love, 
the “words of Christ” are words of life, which communicate pathos and love 
to us. Christ’s message is one that challenges our false ways of being (which 
cannot even be called living) and provides us with a different vision of life, 
one that turns our entire lives upside down. We will explore this “solution” 
to the evils of technology more fully momentarily, but should focus briefly 
on the important insights gained from Henry’s critique of technology. 
While one may well remain doubtful about Henry’s claim that 
Christianity alone provides access to genuine life,20 what is maybe most 
insightful about his treatment is the fundamental critique of science and 
technology he launches instead of a merely cosmetic critique of some of the 
direst consequences of technology, which would continue to regard it as 
intrinsically benign and necessary. He takes seriously that technology has 
become our de facto way of life in the world in such a way that alternatives 
become impossible or at least practically unthinkable. This is precisely the 
reason why any challenge to its pervasive influence is immediately 
dismissed as romantic and unrealistic. Alternatives to lives of TVs, cell-
phones, computers, and countless other even more recent technological 
gadgets can no longer even be envisioned by many people. This basic 
assumption that technology is somehow not only inherently good but also 
“here to stay” and thus a non-negotiable issue, makes any challenge to or 
serious discussion about it practically impossible. Henry realizes this by 
acknowledging that our very questioning of this system always arrives too 
late.21  
Instead, Henry recognizes that our current technological life involves a 
fundamental transformation of human identity and search for meaning. 
Although he puts this primarily in terms of machines and automata (as he 
died before the revolution in social networking and other media-related 
technology), this transformation is heightened by information technology.22 
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Labor is now often conducted almost entirely via screen. People are 
spending increasingly larger percentages of their lives in artificial 
“friendships” in a virtual space that they regard as reality and assume to be 
authentic relationships. Pleasures and pains are experienced in mediated 
fashion. We are displaying our most intimate emotions through machines 
and yet these gadgets are no longer even recognized as machines, but are 
simply taken to be extensions of ourselves.23 The inauthentic, virtual reality 
presented to us in cyberspace has become our supposedly normal way of 
being in the world, a simulacrum of authentic life. Alternatives no longer 
exist, can hardly even be envisioned, and are often made practically 
impossible through the ways in which the contemporary world has become 
structured. Henry is not simply “technophobic,” but recognizes that the 
“world” and “truth” of science and technology is precisely a world with its 
own truth that functions in many ways like a religion by providing an all-
encompassing worldview and life. He is not advocating a “romantic” return 
to some supposedly pristine prior non-technological state.24 Rather, he 
provides a trenchant analysis of the ways in which technology has actually 
reconfigured our lives today. This constitutes not a facile dismissal of 
technology, but a real recognition that within the present worldview non-
technological alternatives are no longer possible. What makes his critique 
particularly valuable is, on the one hand, this insistence that technology has 
become the only truth, posited as an alternative not only to religion but also 
to artistic, cultural, and academic life, and, on the other hand, his proposal 
for a return to human materiality and concrete affectivity instead of some 
docetic or Gnostic flight from the material world.25 Unlike many other 
critics, Henry perceives what is central in technology: a reconfiguration of 
what it means to be human and how humans experience their reality and 
relations with others.26 To address these far more fundamental—and indeed 
absolutely crucial—issues, a mere focus on a few isolated detrimental 
consequences of technology is not sufficient. 
Divine Life and Generation 
Henry argues, then, that most of Western thinking, whether scientific or 
philosophical, has missed the issue of Life and misunderstands what life is. 
He sees this as particularly true of Galilean science, but also criticizes 
Heidegger’s Dasein-philosophy (by which he is certainly also informed in 
important ways) as the culmination of philosophy’s ignoring of 
phenomenological life. He claims that this direct relationship between 
consciousness and its auto-affectivity has never been discovered or 
considered seriously in the history of Western philosophical thought. 
Science, by examining molecules and atoms, has made matters far worse, by 
reducing life to material particles instead of real experience: “In biology there 
is no life; there are only algorithms.”27 Even Heidegger’s analysis of “being-in-
the-world” still considers life from the outside and does not realize its power 
of self-revelation. Henry criticizes what he calls “the very disturbing link 
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between these diverse ways of slandering life.”28 He therefore proposes 
what he considers a radical phenomenology of the flesh, where life is 
understood as auto-affection, experiencing oneself as affected. 
This phenomenology of the flesh refers not to the visible materiality of 
the body, but to the experience of auto-affectivity, as it is expressed in 
emotion and action. In his view Western science and philosophy have made 
an arbitrary and false distinction between life (as visible molecules and 
biological processes) and the ego exercising power over (or being subject to) 
these external processes and materials. Rather, to Henry, Life refers to 
something internal and invisible: it is what generates me and makes me 
myself, I participate in it and it makes possible all my experiences. There is 
an essential passivity to this experience: we “suffer” life because we do not 
give it to ourselves, instead we are affected by it.  Humans are not primarily 
beings in the world, but rather they are generated by “Life” itself. Henry 
explicates this “Life” (which he equates with “truth” and “reality”) as quasi-
divine. He links “God” as the source of “Life” with humans as “living 
beings” who are generated by this Life and live only within it through an 
analysis of Christ as the “arch-son” who gives access to Life for all other 
living beings by being eternally generated in the divine life (and thus 
showing all other sons how to realize their participation in this source of 
Life). 
Henry employs what he calls the “Christian Truth” as an alternative to 
the false truth of the world, represented by Galilean science. These contrasts 
are starkly drawn in I am the Truth, Incarnation, and Words of Christ. He 
claims that Christianity alone has preserved the immediacy of life, that it 
speaks forcefully and authentically of the auto-affection of the flesh, and that 
Christ proclaims this truth directly and without any need for mediation. Yet 
his concern in these works—ostensibly about Christianity—is far less to 
justify Christianity as somehow “true” or to exhort people to Christian faith, 
than to employ its message in service of his phenomenology of the flesh and 
his critique of technology.29 Christianity, as he interprets it, provides an 
alternative vision of life that stands in contrast to the technological mirage of 
the world, which is a denial of life. In these late works on Christianity, 
Henry basically reiterates his criticism of technology that he had laid out in 
Barbarism, but now puts it in contrast to what he interprets as the Christian 
message. Words of Christ probably carries this argument the furthest.30 
Henry contends that Christ—as a fully human being speaking human 
words and being apparently nothing but human—challenges our 
conceptions of the world and turns them upside down. It is precisely this 
challenge to our life that makes Christ’s hearers wonder about his true 
identity. Words of Christ goes on to focus on the words of life Christ speaks 
and on establishing his (and ultimately our) divinity in the self-affecting 
connection to the divine Life. Yet in the course of this larger argument 
Henry is emphatic about the ways in which this word of life challenges the 
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apparent (and false) truths of our world, frequently employing the terms 
“décomposition” and “bouleversement” (which roughly mean “undoing” or 
disintegration and “turning upside down” or upheaval, but have a much 
stronger force in French than in English). In two early chapters (which 
include those terms in the respective titles) Henry attacks the false 
humanism of contemporary society, which he judges incapable of grounding 
any sort of ethics. Christ in his message does not merely try to “better” 
things a bit, but rather pulls them completely apart. It is a radical 
transformation, a kind of transubstantiation, a re-generation, a new birth. 
This includes a complete rupture of standard human relationships that turns 
hierarchies upside down and results in a cataclysmic upheaval of our 
assumptions and expectations about the human condition. Here Henry 
attacks especially the reciprocal nature of human relationships that rely on a 
kind of “tit-for-tat” version of social and economic relationships. He argues 
that Christ’s message completely overturns these conceptions and instead 
shows an interior relation to the divine life.31 Christ’s words, Henry 
suggests, can become life in us, as we hear the divine life in our sufferings 
and joys. The issue is not “believing” in this word, but rather experiencing 
its life as we feel and experience ourselves. The gift of life, offered by Christ, 
delivers us from evil and gives us access to true life. 
Christianity is hence interpreted as offering a solution of redemption to 
the contemporary destruction of life. It can return us to the 
phenomenological immediacy of self-affective life where we experience our 
joys and sorrows directly without having them mediated (and thus rendered 
insensate) via technology and especially the media. Far from being world-
denying or disembodied, Henry claims that Christianity alone offers access 
to true life and reality, including an authentic experience of one’s own flesh 
in all its unmediated passions and sensations. As explored in the first part of 
this paper, it is technology that is life-denying by removing us from the 
“real” world (of work and culture) and the authentic experiences of our own 
flesh. At the same time Henry argues that the Christian life gives access to 
true community as we discover ourselves all part of the divine life generated 
by the source of this life. Our passions and affections are intimately 
connected. Although Words of Christ is ostensibly about showing how Christ 
is divine, it ultimately returns to our ability to hear the divine word about 
our own identity. Henry is not finally interested in a theological statement 
about the incarnation, but in a phenomenological analysis of the human 
condition. Hearing Christ’s words becomes a way of recovering our divine 
source of life that allows us true auto-affectivity, relations with others and a 
genuinely material, fleshly life that authentically experiences passions, 
suffering and joy. Although this is expressed as an affinity with the divine 
that reveals us to be “sons of God” and supported by references to multiple 
Gospels texts, these “Christian” references are exploited for their 
phenomenological content. Ultimately, all this is about the “self-revelation of 
absolute Life” in our “hearts”—our centers of auto-affectivity.32 Hearing the 
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“words of Christ” means to access the interior (and only real) life of our 
“impressions, desires, emotions, wants, feelings, actions, thoughts.”33 
Genuine action and passion, indeed true humanity, are only possible in this 
way. 
Henry emphatically insists that this interpretation of life/flesh is not 
“world-denying” and that it does not ignore materiality. Instead, it opens up 
the only proper path to materiality and fleshly reality, a path that has been 
ignored or denied by scientific and philosophical thought. He judges 
artificial and incoherent the usual division established between the real 
(material, visible) and the imaginary (unreal, invisible). For Henry, there is 
only the one reality of life and the flesh, a concrete (but invisible) materiality, 
namely that of joy and suffering, of pleasure and pain, thus of our most 
immediate experiences and actions. One might say that for Henry the world 
and the body are part and parcel of life itself. It is Western science, instead, 
that stresses a false reality of “evidence” and “visibility” or “appearance” 
but is blind to the actions and feelings that underlie it and alone make it 
possible: “In the field opened by Galilean science, there are material bodies, 
microphysical particles, molecules, amino acid chains, neurons, and so on, 
but no Self. In the field opened by modern science, there is no person.”34 In 
contrast to this emphasis on “material bodies” and “particles,” which 
separates artificially between “soul” and “body” or “materiality” and 
“consciousness,” Henry advocates a more unified view. Only the flesh can 
grant ipseity to the Self. He asserts, for example, that “because it designates 
the phenomenological effectuation of the auto-revelation of Life in the 
ipseity in which each transcendental Self maintains its possibility, because it 
is nothing other than the phenomenological materiality of revelation of self 
which makes of each Self a Self, the flesh is linked to it as its most interior 
phenomenological condition of possibility, to the point where it becomes 
identical with it. There is no Self without flesh—but no flesh that does not 
carry in it a Self.”35 Self and flesh are one. This reality of the flesh is one of 
suffering and affection, constituted by the experiences of joy, sadness, 
pleasure, pain, and so forth. Our experience of the flesh is a direct 
experience of material reality. The flesh is so immediate to us that we cannot 
separate from it. 
Central to this “solution” is a strong distinction between our generation 
in the divine life and the creation of everything else. While the world (and 
presumably nature) is “created,” humans are “generated.” He describes this 
as an “abyss” separating birth and creation.36 Humans participate in life and 
have flesh not by virtue of their physical birth (since no human can actually 
create or give birth to another human) but only by their participation in the 
essence of life (i.e., in God): “The living comes forth in Life by depending on 
the very coming forth of Life in itself, by identifying itself with it—with the 
self-revelation of life itself that is identical with the revelation of God.”37 
There is no real birth in the world: “To be born is not to come into the world. 
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To be born is to come into life,” to be generated by Life.38 This life is 
communicated by the Arch-Son, Christ, to all other sons who are hence not 
merely created but are generated from within the divine Life. Both 
materialism and phenomenology fall short: Material scientific reductionism 
treats humans as created material within the world. Phenomenology 
recognizes that humans are not objects in the world, but experience it. 
Humans are “open” to the world, “have” a world.39 Henry goes even 
beyond this phenomenological analysis to argue that humans are not of the 
world at all nor maintain a relation with the world as something exterior to 
them, but instead experience themselves within the immediacy of the divine 
life in which and by which they are generated. The human is “in fact not 
created,” but engendered in the divine Life.40 
Although Henry does not make this explicit, it seems that animals and 
the rest of the natural world are here lumped together with “world” and its 
creation, not with generation in “life.” He repeatedly contrasts human lives 
with “stone, air, fire” or other inanimate objects in the world.41 Other living 
beings are rarely mentioned. Yet Henry’s definition of the human being as 
“transcendental Self generated in the self-generation of absolute Life and in 
its essential Ipseity—Self taking its ipseity from Life and Life alone” does 
seem to separate the human being from all other living beings.42 He 
consistently speaks of “man” as “son of God,” identified with the Arch-Son, 
Christ, via a “transcendental birth.”43 All this seems to separate our life 
definitely and absolutely from that of all non-human beings, whether alive 
in the traditional sense or not. “Living beings” for Henry, are humans, not 
animals or plants or ecosystems. While this proposal for a renewed 
phenomenology of life or the flesh in his view successfully solves the 
problem of inter-subjectivity, such intersubjectivity is primarily human and 
for all intents and purposes does not include any other living beings. Henry 
does, in fact, occasionally acknowledge this separation explicitly: humans 
are different and separate from natural beings and from the world.44 As 
indicated above, they participate in and are generated from Life in a way in 
which no other being (even one we might conventionally call “living being”) 
is. We receive ipseity and individuality through our participation (and 
generation) in absolute life or flesh. Henry does reject any “care” or 
“concern” for the world in favor of a focus on invisible Life.45 Although this 
is not “world-denying” in the traditional sense, as it is fundamentally 
concerned with the materiality of our feelings and passions, it does seem to 
reject concern for non-human materiality. 
This division between human and non-human life may be due to the 
way in which Henry aligns humans with the divine, and therefore not with 
the natural. This is partially the case because he criticizes so strongly a 
reduction of “Life” to “living organisms.” He wants us to examine our own 
experience of life, instead of that of “protozoa, or, at best, honeybees.”46 Yet 
that often leads him to imply that nothing and no one besides divine and 
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human participate in “Life” in any sense of the term.47 It seems, then, as if 
Henry permanently excludes all non-human beings—regardless of whether 
they are animate or inanimate—from the divine Life which is the only real 
and authentic life. They are part of the world and the kind of false 
simulacrum of life that modern science investigates. Honeybees, apparently, 
are not truly “alive.” Sentient animals, who surely do experience pathos, both 
joy and pain, at least on some level, do not appear on Henry’s radar screen. 
Henry’s phenomenology, then, despite its stark and insightful critique of 
technology, appears not to be useful for environmental thinking that would 
be more attentive to the impact of technology on the earth and its living 
creatures. Yet, so I want to suggest in closing, although Henry himself does 
not include non-human animals in his vision of Life, his phenomenology of 
life can still provide important resources for a more inclusive proposal. 
Henry can provide us with useful eco-phenomenological insight, even if he 
himself did not push his philosophy in such a direction. 
Can Henry’s “Life” Have Implications for Non-Human Life? 
Henry does not explicitly consider animals in his treatment. The stark 
contrasts he draws are usually between objects in the world on the one side 
and humans on the other. The above mention of honeybees is together with 
a brief critical exploration of our experience of a dog and a tree, the only 
mention of non-human living beings in his text.48 Yet, his exclusion of nature 
or the earth seems neither intentional nor particularly fundamental to his 
emphasis on materiality, but rather arises out of his strong criticism of 
Western fascination with the scientific and technological enterprise. As we 
have seen, Henry’s critique of science and its pre-occupation with data and 
reduction of everything to processes provides important insights for our 
contemporary situation. Although the way in which he formulates it often 
seems to lead to a rejection of the environment, the earth, and nature (either 
as wrapped up with the scientific outlook that focuses on “molecules” and 
“honeybees” or as insignificant because not concerned with affection and 
Life), such a rejection does not appear absolutely necessary for his project. 
Life, Henry insists, is transmitted “to all possible living beings.” While such 
living beings for him are ones characterized by individual ipseity, auto-
affection, and affirmation (or acknowledgment) of Life, his account of Life 
may well prove fruitful beyond the living beings on whom he himself 
concentrates. Let me suggest two possible ways of applying Henry’s 
phenomenology of Life to non-human “living beings,” the first taking its 
inspiration from his critique of technology, the second from his material 
phenomenology of self-affected Life. This is not to argue that Henry himself 
makes or would have made these applications, but to show how his 
phenomenology provides resources for a more eco-phenomenological 
focus.49 
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First of all, the core of Henry’s critique of technology actually applies in 
very important ways to non-human nature. Technology has turned nature 
into a resource to be exploited at will. It has similarly treated its subjects as 
simulacra devoid of life. Nature is no longer experienced immediately, but is 
mediated through technology, both to us and to its other members among 
themselves. Animals, especially in the meat factories, are treated as objects 
without feeling or context. The land is regarded as entirely inanimate, as a 
mere locus for food production. Its plant life is to be razed, its nutrients 
killed with pesticides and other toxic chemicals, and artificial, highly 
manipulated cash crops are then raised through infusion of fertilizers that 
violate the integrity of the soil. The cultural and living context of earth and 
land has been murdered, just as the natural, symbiotic relationships that 
used to exist between humans and animals have been destroyed, so that 
they now seem not only foreign but practically inanimate to us. A view 
regarding nature as alive or even as a person is dismissed as romantic or 
mythical. 
All of Henry’s insights regarding technology (except maybe the one 
explicitly concerned with university life) can be directly applied to non-
human life as well. The way in which technology has alienated us from our 
labor corresponds to the way in which it has alienated us from the land. The 
objectification of economic labor is, in fact, particularly visible in modern 
agribusiness with its mono-cultures and objectification of the land and in the 
industry of meat-production. Both eliminate human relationships to animal 
life and the land and make labor not only deeply alienated but ultimately 
meaningless and violent. Instead of living in a symbiotic relationship with 
the land and the animals as traditional farming communities did, the labor is 
done with mega-machines that turn nature into an automaton, a passive 
object. Meaningful labor and genuine care for one’s surroundings have been 
eliminated. This alienation from land and labor is depicted most forcefully 
by Wendell Berry who already in the 1970s described modern agriculture as 
a crisis of character, agriculture and culture.50 He provided detailed 
descriptions of the ways in which modern agribusiness in particular is not 
only ecologically destructive but alienates us from the land and ultimately 
from ourselves.51 Similar alienation characterizes information-technology, 
which has severed all contact with the earth and operates in a virtual reality 
where all experiences are mediated. 
The loss of culture Henry sees as resulting from technological 
replacement of genuine meaning similarly extends to our relationship to 
nature. Painting need not be purely pastoral to be rooted in a connectedness 
to the earth.52 Heidegger already pointed to the need for rootedness in the 
ground in order for genuine creativity to be possible.53 The speed of 
contemporary life, which Henry sees as a particular detrimental effect of 
technology, as it makes the kind of creativity necessary for genuine cultural 
contributions almost impossible, similarly affects our relation to nature. Not 
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only does this apply to fast-food, which dehumanizes nature (from highly 
processed ingredients that no longer go bad to the cutting of the rainforest in 
order to produce the meat necessary for this diet), but also to the ways in 
which we experience nature when we do decide to venture into it (the 
average time spent in a national park—usually considered as the epitome of 
“real” nature as “wilderness”—is only a few minutes).54 No genuine 
encounter with nature can take place in such highly manufactured tourism 
and, in fact, every effort is made to reduce any uncomfortable intrusion of 
nature into the experience, which is enjoyed from the car or the tourist 
center and results primarily in digital memories in virtual space.55 
The third critique Henry provides of technology can also be applied to 
non-humans. On the one hand, technology radically changes the 
relationships animals have with each other, both their own species and their 
traditional habitats. Again the meat industry, which separates veal calves 
almost immediately from their mothers or packs hens into tiny cages by the 
dozens, provides a particularly vivid example of this. But technology also 
fundamentally alters the relationships animals have with the land by killing 
and destroying it, whether through pesticides and other chemical 
treatments, which precisely try to rupture the relationship of certain 
undesirable plants and animals to the soil, or whether via the destruction of 
habitats through development, pollution, and climate change. And most 
obviously, it alters human relationships with and experience of non-human 
creatures.56 To many people, especially the increasingly larger percentage of 
urban dwellers, nature appears only as something foreign, either a resource 
to be exploited at will, a menace in the form of severe weather events, or a 
possible tourist destination, a pretty backdrop for the “real”—virtual—
experience. Cyberspace is far more real to many people than plants or 
animals are or the habitats in which they and ultimately we live. Our 
environment has become an entirely artificial one, where we control the 
temperature and the ambiance, simulating eternal spring.57 Due to the large-
scale transportation of food over long distances, food consumption is no 
longer linked in any recognizable way to the seasons. Harvest time has 
become a meaningless category. This is a loss of a life-world that affects our 
culture and our humanity in deeply troubling ways, even apart from the 
damage it does to land and animals. 
This also has a visual component that is linked to Henry’s criticism of 
our televised obsession with images. Food and nature are “sold” online.58 
Images are purchased, even within stores where the advertising and 
presentation matters as much as the actual items purchased (apart from the 
fact that most products displayed in our grocery stores are highly processed 
and have little resemblance to real food and even supposedly perishable 
items are often heavily manipulated to the point where it takes them an 
unnaturally long time to rot and where seeds are either non-existent or 
cannot be used for growing new plants). Even supposedly living things such 
C h r i s t i n a  M .  G s c h w a n d t n e r  |  1 2 9  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XX, No 2 (2012)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2012.532 
as fruits and vegetables are essentially dead when they reach our table. In all 
these ways, Henry’s critique of technology sheds important light also on the 
destruction it wreaks on nature and not just on human life. Contemporary 
technology destroys life and it does so in even deeper ways than Henry 
himself recognizes in his exclusive emphasis on human culture. Henry’s 
critique, then, is eminently helpful for a more “ecological” reading. Can the 
alternative he proposes also be fruitful for a more inclusive vision? Let me 
explore a preliminary suggestion for doing so.59 
Life, according to Henry, is immanent, immediate and subjective. It is 
what allows us to experience our own passions, joys, and sufferings most 
intimately. We are auto-affectivity. He rejects visions of life that reduce life to 
something other than itself in the form of molecules, amino-acid chains, and 
neurons. These try to explain why we experience emotions and desires, but 
are not themselves affectivity. Henry calls for a rich description and 
experience of life, such as it is expressed in culture: great literature and art, 
religion and ethics convey life and give us direct access to it. Such an 
apparent distinction between “nature” and “culture” is characteristic also of 
much environmental discourse. Social ecology in particular tries to 
overcome this dichotomy by interpreting social evolution as continuous 
with biological evolution. Leopold’s land ethic and various versions of deep 
ecology also call us to recognize ourselves as part of the web of life and as 
intricately connected to all other beings. But this often feels like a reduction 
of humans to biology or ecology. Culture becomes only a step in the 
evolutionary process and humans a mere parasite in the ecological web. 
Henry’s conception of life might provide a useful alternative here because it 
elevates life to culture instead of reducing culture to biology. Much eco-
phenomenology similarly struggles with expressing ways in which we 
might articulate affinities with other creatures: Do they exert a call upon 
us—à la Lévinas—or do they also make a world—contra Heidegger—or do 
they participate in intercorporeity in Merleau-Ponty’s sense? Henry’s notion 
of Life might provide a “thicker” or richer account of affectivity or sentient 
life for eco-phenomenological thinkers, one in which other living beings 
participate from the first in life instead of having to extend it to them via 
arguments based on analogy or similarity. 
Most obviously, one could argue for a continuity of affectivity between 
human and non-human animals. Many animals do experience pathos in the 
immediate way Henry outlines for humans. In fact, their experience of joy 
and suffering may be more obviously immanent and immediate than our 
own, which at least has the appearance of being mediated through 
consciousness and reflection. Henry tries to overcome the apparent distance 
for human consciousness in favor of an identification of phenomenon and 
phenomenality, while he remains silent on the ways in which other sentient 
species might already be self-affected in precisely the manner he advocates 
for humans. It is also significant that this unreflected immediacy of animal 
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experiences of suffering has in fact often been used precisely in order to 
substantiate our superiority over and fundamental distinction from non-
human species. The fact that we can think about joy and pain and do not 
merely give in to them is taken to confirm the superiority of our human 
consciousness, one supposedly not shared by animals. While much recent 
ethological research, such as that of Mark Bekoff, has suggested that such 
convictions about fundamental human-animal distinctions must be revised, 
it is interesting that Henry reverses this traditional view and now sees the 
immediacy of the auto-affection of our flesh that allows no reflective 
distance as somehow uniquely human. As far as I can see he does not 
provide any argument, however, as to why non-human sentient species 
would not experience joy and suffering in similar immanent and non-
mediated fashion. Although it seems that animals do not participate in the 
divine life as Henry articulates it, he does not provide any actual argument 
for (or outright denial of) why they could not experience immediate auto-
affectivity. Affectivity, as immanent immediacy of joy and suffering 
inseparable from their very experience in our flesh, connects us to rather 
than separates us from other sentient species.60 
Furthermore, this account of affectivity, despite Henry’s own emphasis 
on culture, actually requires the natural elements that are always involved in 
any experience of pleasure and pain. While this is obvious for animals, it is 
also true of human experience. Although my suffering is inextricably and 
immediately mine, a truly rich account of pleasure and pain requires nature 
in obvious and subtler ways. A phenomenologically “thick” description of 
pleasure or satisfaction, hunger and thirst, fatigue or joy, cannot be provided 
without speaking of nature or experience grounded in earthly materiality. 
Many of our joys and pleasures involve nature and physical materiality: the 
texture of the dough I knead, the smell of the freshly baked bread, the 
hardness of the crust, the full taste of the first bite. What about the peculiar 
joy of a sunrise or the fatigue inspired by a long hike in the fresh air? How 
about the excitement of a toddler over a ladybug, the texture of a leaf, the 
colors of a butterfly, the sweet taste of chocolate, the smell of freshly ground 
coffee beans? Passion, whether as suffering or emotion, cannot be described 
fully without an appeal to nature or at least without a description of the 
materiality and physicality of pleasures and passions.61  My experiencing 
myself experiencing implies the real textures and flavors of nature (and it 
often requires their experience as “alive” in some way—the joy over the 
butterfly is experienced rather differently, especially by the young child, 
when a pin is stuck through its body in a museum than when it flutters over 
spring flowers, regardless of whether the butterfly has any sense of suffering 
or joy in one or the other experience).62 
While Henry himself does not stress the “earthiness” of our experience 
and, in fact, his constant condemnation of Galileo and biological 
reductionism can suggest the opposite, his account of affectivity is indeed 
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about “reality” as we experience it in all its physicality. It is explicitly 
material and fleshly. In Henry this  materiality becomes elevated as Life itself. 
It is our very identity as creatures of pathos. “Matter” is not “the other of 
phenomenality but its essence.”63 And this Life is subjectivity: “Life is 
absolute subjectivity inasmuch as it experiences itself and is nothing other 
than that experience.”64 Instead of reducing human life to biological or 
ecological processes, Henry elevates all of material Life to affectivity. Life is 
a mystery of auto-affectivity: “That is the mystery of life: the living being is 
coextensive with all of the life within it; everything within it is its own life. 
The living being is not founded on itself; instead it has its basis in life. This 
basis, however, is not different from itself; it is the auto-affection in which it 
auto-affects itself and thus with which it is identical.”65 It is this life and 
pathos, Henry argues, which enables genuine community. Can this 
community be extended beyond humans? 
Henry’s own account actually makes that much easier than traditional 
attempts at extending consideration to other creatures. Sharing of experience 
in Henry does not require representation or analogy, because it is always a 
direct and immanent experience of life. Life is not an accumulation of 
particles marked by genetic information, but the rich complexity of fleshly 
and material fears, desires, and emotions that constitute our experiences as 
living beings—our active enjoyment of life and passive suffering of it. And 
this is why in at least one place Henry can say: “Inasmuch as the essence of 
community is affectivity, the community is not limited to humans alone. It 
includes everything that is defined in itself by the primal suffering of life 
and thus by the possibility of suffering. We can suffer with everything that 
suffers. This pathos-with is the broadest form of every conceivable 
community.”66 Our suffering of life is connected to the suffering of all other 
creatures—at least inasmuch as they experience suffering—and it is a 
suffering of the real, material world (albeit not the false, “represented” 
world of Galilean science). In this way, we experience “pathos-with” the 
entire cosmos and all its living and suffering inhabitants. Although Henry 
himself never returns to this suggestion of community with other creatures, 
but the Christian language he adopts in his later works actually serves to 
reinforce distinctions between humans and other living beings, his material 
phenomenology opens a much wider possibility for shared suffering and joy 
among living creatures. An environmental ethics inspired by Henry’s 
philosophy, then, would not need to posit artificial connections to other 
living beings, attempting to bridge a distance via knowledge of their 
evolutionary development, genetic similarity or ecological connectedness, 
but the connection is always already there as we each individually, 
subjectively, but in community, together, suffer the life that is in each one of 
us and that is being destroyed by contemporary techno-science. We need not 
“recognize” the distant “call” of the tree or deliberate whether animals have 
“faces,” but we share already in the community of all suffering subjects of 
life. Their flesh—and their fate—is ultimately ours, too. 
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6; emphases his). This would suggest, however, that sentient animals are not things. 
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48 Henry, I am the Truth, 41. 
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2003), 64].) 
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Point Press, 1981). Many of his other books also pursue this argument. 
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household” in the section “The Domestication of Absence” (The Unsettling of 
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“The Gift of Good Land,” the final essay in the book with the same title. Like 
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spiritual and moral loneliness, and others to want” (281). Although Henry does not 
speak of the life of creation, he describes the desecration and loneliness caused by 
technology in similar stark terms. 
52 For several contemporary attempts to ground art in nature more explicitly, see 
David Macauley’s discussion in his Elemental Philosophy: Earth, Air, Fire, and Water 
as Environmental Ideas (Albany: SUNY, 2010), especially 338-45. See also Edward S. 
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Indiana University Press, 2004), 260-69. 
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of Henry in important ways. See Jacques Ellul, The Humiliation of the Word, trans. 
Joyce Main Hanks (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1985), 121-24. His The Technological Society and Propaganda are also useful in this 
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See, for example, “Simulacra and Simulations” in Jean Baudrillard: Selected 
Writings, ed. Mark Poster (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). For a 
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